Crossing the Line of Departure
The following morning, the TAC CP jumped forward to the Iraqi border to control the breach into Iraq. Our engineer company, to whom we referred as "Sapper", was tasked with breaching four 15-kilometer lanes across an electrical fence, three berms and several tank ditches. This was accomplished in rapid fashion and we started sending our units through the breach and into Iraq.
Our first unit across was our LAR company. They encountered some Bedouin tribesmen right across the border. The Bedouins promptly surrendered to them. Neither the Bedouins nor their flocks poised a threat to us so we left them there -- bewildered at our presence.
![]()
At 0652 Zulu (Greenwich Meantime) on the 21st of March 2003, I crossed into Iraq. Although we had a specific march order for the Regimental Combat Team established and had briefed it dozens of times, it seemed more like a horse race to our first objective. As we had not been permitted to use the road in our area (the Army had priority), we were all traveling across the Iraqi desert. As far as I could see on either side of my vehicle were columns of trucks, tanks, and HMMWV’s kicking up dust as we streaked north. We passed numerous nomadic sheep herding families looking at us curiously from their tents as rumbled past.
![]()
Our first objective was too secure the Luhays Oil Fields about 50 miles north of the Kuwati border. Secure was a nominal term, as the Army had already passed through the area with a force three times our size the previous day. Never the less, we were directed to stop here for the night to allow the rest of the 3d Infantry Division’s combat trains needed to get past us to head west while we continued the attack north. After about 8 hours of cross-country driving, the Regimental Combat Team set in defensive positions in the vicinity of the oil fields.
We got up around 0200 following morning and moved the TAC CP north to the vicinity of Task Force Tarawa’s Forward Command Post. At that location, we attempted to get an intelligence update and coordinate fuel resupply. Two CH-53E helicopters lifted in four large fuel bladders to a position nearby. This was to be our source of fuel for the next several days.
![]()
A long and dusty ride North into Iraq
From this position, we controlled our unit’s tactical movements north of Jalibah airfield. Our orders were to establish blocking positions to the north and west. We were to defend the vital intersection of Route 8 and Hose Reel Road from two brigades of the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division that were across the Euphrates just to our north and remnants of the 51st Mechanized Division that was currently getting attacked by the First Marine Division to our east. To our northwest, the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division was attacking units of the Iraqi 11th Infantry Division in the vicinity of Talil Air Base, southwest of An Nasiriyah, and pushing the attack north across the Route 1 Bridge about 15 kilometers west of the town. We were told that we were going to remain in this position for at least 48 hours.
Our Light Armored Reconnaissance company, call sign "Gunfighter", pushed east on Route 8 to block any attacks from that direction. They captured 40-50 Iraqi soldiers who were fleeing the battle in the Rumaylah oil fields to the east. The prisoners were transferred to our ALOC for holding until higher headquarters could accept them.
Our artillery unit, 1st Battalion, 10th Marines (1/10), call sign "Nightmare", fired our first shots of the war on that day. It was a counter-battery mission fired against enemy artillery across the Euphrates River. I was pretty pumped to finally be in the fight. I had been pretty confident that we were just going to follow around the 1st Marine Division and handle their enemy prisoners of war (EPW’s). Little did I know, I was going to get more war than I wanted in just a few hours.
The TAC CP moved forward to conduct a reconnaissance of our route into An Nasiriyah. The roads were just clobbered with Army convoys moving northwest. We got past them by driving on the road shoulders until we got to the cloverleaf intersection of Routes 7 and 8. There a Military Police unit informed us we could go no further because the Army had priority of the roads. We weren’t too distraught, there was obviously no way we were going to move into An Nasiriyah until that traffic cleared -- obviously not for a day or two.
![]()
The author (left) and the RCT-2 Operations Officer with the TAC CP
As the TAC CP rejoined the rest of the Regimental Combat Team as the sun was setting on the 22nd of March, we got word that our mission had changed. The Operations Officer (OpsO) and Commanding Officer went over to the MEB headquarters to get the details while I checked on the status of communications at our Main CP. My assistant S-6 had things well in hand. SIPRNET, the military’s classified e-mail and web browsing network, was operational so I typed out quick e-mail to a friend in the artillery regiment back a Camp Lejeune. Thinking we had seen pretty much all the action we were going to, I wanted to let him know that 1/10 had entered the fray and had fired a couple dozen shots.
A couple of hours later, the OpsO returned from higher headquarters with word that we were going to move out as soon as we could issue the order to our subordinate units. We had been instructed to complete a relief in place with the 3rd Brigade Combat Team of the Army’s 3rd Infantry Division by midnight. After that time, the battle space around An Nasiriyah would belong to us. We were also instructed to be prepared to attack and seize the bridges in the city by 0400 the next morning.
We issued the order. As soon as possible, the TAC CP and the LAR company would depart for the Route 1 Bridge, 15 kilometers west of An Nasiriyah to conduct the battle handover with the Army. Third Battalion, Second Marines (3/2) needed to get to the western bridge as well, but it was going to be a while before they could get mounted up and on the road again. They were to follow us a soon as possible.
First Battalion, Second Marines (1/2) was the main effort for the attack and would spearhead the capture of the eastern bridges. Second Battalion, Eighth Marines (2/8) was to follow in trace. 1/10 would provide artillery support. The plan was for each unit to travel through the night and set up south of the city for the attack.
Knowing that we had driven all day, would drive most of the night and attack first thing in the morning, we asked higher headquarters if we could delay the attack until the Marines could get a couple hours of sleep. We were told that "adrenalin would keep the Marines alert" and we must secure the bridges as soon as possible. One higher headquarters staff officer told our OpsO, "Get moving. If you guys don’t [screw] this mission up, we just might get another one."
Looking out at the endless row of stationary headlights, I knew the 65-kilometer trip was going to take forever. We didn’t have forever -- we only had until midnight. So after driving all day, we jumped in our trucks and drove all night.
Next...
Mr. Toad's Wild Ride
Speeding down the highway at night, without lights (going the wrong-way).
© 2004 Iraqi-Freedom-Diary.com